As Balloons Threaten Relations, Could Satellites be the Next Target?
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In the complex, modern global landscape of 2023, a single balloon managed to unravel relations between two of the world’s greatest superpowers. But throughout the balloon-fueled mania, everybody seemed to forget that both countries are constantly checking up on each other with a much more efficient method of espionage: satellites. Thanks to their orbital vantage points and ability to collect high-definition images and signals from their targets, they make excellent spies. What’s more, satellites lurk in the global commons of space – as opposed to airspace – meaning regulations on their activities are lax.
China and the US – both space superpowers – boast fleets of hundreds of military or espionage satellites; China has at least 260, the US over 400 (not counting the many commercial satellite intelligence providers). But with tensions on the rise and a growing global dependence on space, could satellites be the next target of nations’ efforts to impair hostile intelligence efforts?
Legally, it’s a tricky question; UN space law is notoriously murky. The initial treaty – the Outer Space Treaty – dates back to 1967, before mankind set foot on the moon. The decades to follow saw less planetary colonization than the laws accounted for, but much more privatization and even militarization. The treaties, overseen by the UN’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), forbid only weapons of mass destruction in space – not regular ones – and demand the peaceful use of celestial bodies such as the moon and Mars, but not necessarily empty space, which includes Earth’s orbit.
As a result, save for nuclear warfare, Earth’s orbit is relatively lawless. Some smaller rules exist – such as countries being responsible for their own spacecraft and their mishaps, an obligation to rescue astronauts when needed, and a ban on sovereignty, or ‘owning’ space – but not even the creation of space debris is forbidden under UN law, according to Frans von der Dunk, a professor of space law at the University of Nebraska College of Law.
However, while space itself is a global commons, the items launched into it are not; as explained here, space law demands that objects placed into orbit must be registered to a state, which by extension means that states have jurisdiction over their objects and an attack on them can be seen as an attack on the given nation. An attack on a satellite could therefore be considered an invasion or act of war. And as detailed here, Article 51 of the UN Charter states that an act of self-defense is acceptable in the face of an ‘armed attack’.
The unique nature of satellites complicates this matter somewhat. ASATs – anti-satellite weapons – can consist of a high-energy laser aimed at the machine to disable it; the US, China, and Russia have all dabbled in this technology. The job can also be done by shooting a missile at the satellite in question. But as noted here, such a blatant attack – retaliation or not – would be serious grounds for escalation, not to mention the creation of millions of bits of space debris that would mess with orbital activities for all parties involved.
That’s not to say attacks on satellites aren’t happening; they’re just sneakier and therefore harder to define under international law. Cyberattacks seem to be a popular choice for disabling the machines, but since they technically don’t use force, it is their consequences that determine their severity. Often, it is up to the country in question to evaluate whether a cyberattack is equal in its fallout to a physical one; the US, for example, lists factors such as the ‘intent of the attacker’, the ‘effects of the cyber activity’, and the ‘context of the event’ as considerations, leaving much room for interpretation.
It is important to note that espionage is not necessarily an act of war; in fact, as mentioned here, the gathering of information can clear up misunderstandings and prevent escalations. Such was the idea behind the Treaty of Open Skies, which allows unarmed surveillance flights over countries party to it – but the US and Russia withdrew from it in 2020 and 2021, respectively. China, by the way, never signed on in the first place. But while nations may not like it, satellites sitting in space – which belongs to no one – are perfectly legal. Outside Earth’s atmosphere, countries have less jurisdiction, but laws are vaguer, too. Satellites are often subject to getting spied on themselves; China, for one, has hacked US satellites in the past (and continues to jam them), while a US machine has tried getting close and personal to its newly-launched Chinese neighbors to take a closer look.
But regardless of whether satellites spy on Earth or each other, growing tensions and the resulting restrictions on information gathering does not bode well for them – just look at the fate of their balloon cousin. If banning aerial espionage is as easy for a country as withdrawing from a treaty, banning surveillance from space might not be much harder.
The loose laws surrounding what constitutes a cyberattack (often left to the discretion of nations) don’t help, either; the nebulous policies allow for the definition to change depending on political contexts. For example, many satellites contribute to signals intelligence – SIGINT – and the signals collected might come encrypted and are later decoded by the spying country. Depending on the consequences to the spied-upon nation, does this stealing of data justify disabling the spying satellite in the name of ‘self-defense’?
And that’s just the intelligence side of the situation; satellites are no strangers to military use. As well as supplying communications, reconnaissance, and navigation systems, they provide live combat assistance, too; take the satellite internet company Starlink, for example. It teamed up with the US Air Force and successfully linked with tanks and gunships during a live fire exercise in 2020. More recently, Starlink announced Starshield, a larger range of its satellites designed specifically for the US government – already its biggest American customer – to integrate classified payloads into. Starlink, with over 3,300 satellites in orbit, has also been a crucial part of the war in Ukraine, both for communication systems and drone operations. Though the company has since blocked its satellites’ use in Ukraine in an effort to decrease (foreign) weaponization of the program, it has proven that satellites’ military advantages are undeniable. For their trouble, Starlink satellites were repeatedly targeted by Russian cyberattacks.
Again, the same ambiguous laws pose a threat to satellites and international relations. And we can already see the first consequences taking shape: China, spooked by Starlink’s capabilities as a military tool, claims that the constellation is ‘threatening its national security’ and devised plans on how to take it out more definitively using soft- and hard-kill methods.
Still, despite the volatile legal and political circumstances, no major incident has taken place – yet. Often, satellites’ ground receivers are targeted because although a satellite would be a more exposed target, reaching them is simply impossible for most nations. But as mentioned here, sinking launch costs and the rapid development of technology has led to space being more accessible than ever. This not only means increased access to ASATs, but more nations relying on satellites to function; destroying a country’s way of life might become as simple as taking out its satellites.
The booming space and satellite industry and lack of regulations thereof also opens the door to hackers that could disable or control the vulnerable satellites. This could lead to them shutting down a country or company’s infrastructure; they could even steer the machines to crash into each other – or into space stations hosting humans. Several nations, including space powers such as the US, China, and Russia, are starting to take notice and are gearing up for the possibility of escalation.
The three major space powers have already proven their ballistic ASAT capabilities, but that’s far from all. With jammers and cyberwarfare already commonplace, lasers have also been used by Russia and China, and are in development by the US; the latter’s Space Force is building a large-scale communications blocker, while China is pursuing satellites with robotic arms that can simply grab hold of another one.
This kind of maneuver is not necessarily nefarious; it can also be used to relocate defunct satellites or space junk, or even service malfunctioning machines. It is part of an ongoing trend in the industry known as Rendezvous Proximity Operations (RPO), which can involve in-orbit servicing and refueling; though these will become important for human missions to Mars and beyond, the dual-use technology of approaching other objects in orbit will have an impact on satellite warfare too.
Another RPO-based product is perhaps the most emblematic technology of the increasingly militarized orbital landscape: hunter satellites. As their name suggests, these satellites – developed by the company True Anomaly, cofounded by former US Air Force major Even ‘Jolly’ Rogers – are designed to approach enemy craft and, unlike orbital rendezvouses of the past, disable them by means of jamming or cyberattacks while gathering information on their capabilities. According to Kaitlyn Johnson, deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic & International Studies in Washington, D.C., such a system ‘could cause unintentional escalation’; ‘it might be read by our adversaries as a military-directed company’ as opposed to an intelligence-focused one, she says. How that plays out will be seen after the first batch of satellites launches in October 2023.
While all these possibilities sound as if they were torn from the pages of a sci-fi novel, they really shouldn’t come as a surprise; a combination of unprecedented technological development and legal sluggishness will give you some pretty bizarre scenarios. Already, the relatively tame balloon incident is causing all sorts of trouble; China has even suggested taking some sort of retaliatory action in response to it being popped. It’s hard to see how relations will be restored anytime soon, and there are bigger things to come; if a balloon can cause this much damage, just imagine what a satellite war will do.